. Control through interlocking board memberships was a practice widely recognized by historians of the early 1900s. Investment banks and other firms would place representatives on the boards of corporations they controlled, as J. P. Morgan & Co. did with U.S. Steel (see Mizruchi, 1981 , for a review of this literature). It is current practice to recognize that powerful interests in corporations are entitled to board representation. Such interests include large stockholders, major lenders, customers, and suppliers (see Mace, 1971 ; Business Week, 1980a; 1980b, for some examples).
Since corporate boards typically include from 1 0 to 25 or more members, however, having two or three representatives does not ensure control. Furthermore, several theorists have argued that interlocking involves "cooptation" of outside interests rather than submission to them (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Pfeffer, 1972; Allen, 1974; Pfefferand Salancik, 1978) . Thus, since boards are often represented by a plurality of interests, a more accurate description of interlocking would be that it permits influence rather than control. Influence has been defined as leadership ability in situations of collective activity and as the ability to affect the outcome of events (Hopkins, 1964) . The definition employed here is the ability of an organization to exercise power over another organization, power being the ability to realize one's goals even in the face of external opposition (Weber, 1947:1 52). Control is defined as the ability to determine the long-run policies of a firm (Juran and Louden, 1966: 48; Kotz, 1978) . Of course, influence and control often correspond, but influence need not constitute control, and thus it is the more general term.
Measuring Influence with Interlocks
It follows from the above discussion that one way of measuring influence in networks of corporations is to sum each firm's number of interlocks. Those firms with the highest number of interlocks would be the most influential in the network. A number of criticisms have been levelled against this approach, however. First, it ignores the considerable variance in the number of directors per company and, therefore, the potential of a company to establish affiliations (Bonacich, 1 972a). Second, it implicitly weights all interlocks equally and assumes a linear relationship between interlocks and other organizational characteristics. Third, it ignores the direction of interlocking. Which corporation does an interlocked director represent? Some companies may have a large number of interlocks because they are influential, while others may simply be coopted. Finally, this approach ultimately treats the individual firm as the unit of analysis. Knowledge of a firm's number of interlocks may tell little about where it stands in relation to other firms in its interorganizational network. One firm may have five interlocks with five heavily-interlocked firms while another may have ten interlocks with two relatively obscure firms.
Centrality and Influence
Recently, considerable effort has been devoted to developing more sophisticated models of network relationships. Developments derived from small-group network research include the use of multidimensional scaling (Levine, 1972; Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1979) Mintz (1979) . This measure utilizes the classic sociometric concept of centrality. A point (e.g., a company) is central to the extent that: (1) a large number of other points can be reached in a small number of steps (Bavelas, 1948 (Bavelas, , 1950 Mackenzie, 1966; Nieminen, 1973; Freeman, 1977) and (2) paths from other points must go through it in order to reach third points (Freeman, 1979) . In the present study, the Bonacich centrality measure was chosen over other similar measures because it lends itself to a unique set of matrix manipulations.
Centrality is defined operationally as a function of a point's structural position within a set of relations. However, numerous studies have found a strong relationship between centrality and other characteristics. Leavitt (1951) , for example, found that centrality in communication networks was strongly correlated with variables such as satisfaction in group activity, leadership, and influence on the outcome of events. Using four types of communication structures, he found that the differences between the most central figure and the others increased with increasing hierarchy of each structure. Studies by Bass (1949), Strodtbeck (1954), and March (1956) provided similar evidence of the relation between centrality (as measured by time spent interacting or by acts initiated) and influence. In a summary of this evidence in connection with a study of his own, Hopkins (1964) concluded that centrality was a strong predictor of both influence and rank (leadership). In his study, the correlation between centrality and influence was .82. Similar results have been found in interorganizational studies such as those by Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970) , Laumann and Pappi (1976) , Galaskiewicz (1979) , and Rogers and Maas (1979) , which found strong relationships between reputed influence and centrality in interorganizational networks.
METHOD

Testing the Validity of Centrality as a Measure of Influence
The evidence from both small group and interorganizational research thus suggests that network centrality is strongly related to a number of hierarchical characteristics, including influence, leadership, and status. This in turn suggests that a centrality measure could serve as an indicator of influence among large corporations, but it has not been demonstrated that centrality measures produce results substantially different from results based on number of interlocks. Although Mariolis (1975) produced some different results, his data were from recentyears and, thus, interpretation was difficult. The present study addresses this problem by choosing data that are more easily interpretable and for which reliable independent evidence exists. Using these data, the Bonacich centrality index was compared to a simple count of number of corporate interlocks. In addition, two modifications of the Bonacich centrality index were tested.
The number of interlocks and the three measures of centrality were calculated for 1 66 large American corporations from the year 1904. Next, these four measures were compared with historical accounts of the period to determine which provided the most accurate measure of corporate influence. Unlike recent years, in which there has been sharp controversy over the relative power of various corporations (especially banks), the period around the turn of the century was characterized by an almost uniform consensus concerning the power of certain groups in the economy.
Data Selection
Theyear 1904was chosen fora numberof reasons. First, itwas part of the era of finance capitalism, when no important regulatory constraints influenced affiliations. Second, corporate influence had begun to be measured by affiliations; stock ownership was no longer considered the primary basis of corporate control (Corey, 1930:284) . Because small stockholders were widely dispersed, major capitalists found it relatively easy to elect themselves or their representatives to a directorship of nearly any large company (Bunting, 1979) . Finally, during this period there was an active group of business writers and academicians who were concerned about the growing concentration of control of American finance and industry. To find C1, a matrix of overlaps (R) must be computed. There are several possible measures of intensity that can be used (for a discussion of these, see Mariolis, Schwartz, and Mintz, 1979) . In the present study, the measure developed by Mariolis ( Although it has a different purpose, this calculation is identical to factor analysis. The first eigenvector will have all nonnegative or non-positive values, and there will be as many all-same-sign eigenvectors as there are discrete components in the graph. All other eigenvectors will have some negative and some positive values. Because the calculation produces one more unknown than the number of equations, the actual value of the centrality scores is arbitrary. The one arbitrary parameter is selected such that the firm with the highest centrality receives a score of 1 .0. Other scores then range from 0 to 1.
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The equations are solved by means of the power method for extracting eigenvectors (Noble, 1969: 299-300). In some cases, two firms are so heavily interlockedwith each otherthat their centrality scores become inflated, thus distorting the entire system. Because such situations are rare yet have significant effects, the suggestion of Bearden et al. (1975) that the number of recorded interlocks in rij be limited to three has been followed.
Measuring Strength of Ties
The Bonacich centrality measure fails to distinguish between different types of interlocks. To correct this problem, a measure incorporating Granovetter's distinction between strong and weak ties, based on the frequency and intensity of interaction (Granovetter, 1973) , may be applied. This concept has been used to indicate the significance of a particular interlock ( The assigned weights are, of course, arbitrary. They are based on the assumption that A exercises a disproportionate share of influence over B but that this influence is not absolute. As with most measures of this type, their value is determined by the tenability of the results they produce.
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The directional matrix is asymmetric such that R74R' while the Bonacich centrality measure is based on the assumption of a symmetric matrix. The problem with the asymmetric matrix is that more than one solution to the equation is possible. The continued use of the term "centrality" to describe the directional measure may be confusing to some readers, in particular those who, because of the asymmetry, find this measure similar to Moreno's concept of "prestige" (Moreno, 1953) . In Moreno's concept, and in popularity measures in general, those with high status are chosen as friends more frequently than they choose others as friends (Burt, 1980). In our terms, these individuals receive more interlocks than they send. In the presentanalysis of corporate influence, it is argued that those with high influence send more than they receive. The term "centrality" is used even in the directional measure because directional centrality is based on the same structural view of centrality as the full matrix measure. The only difference is that in the directional measure a firm's centrality is weighted based on the particular character of different interlocks. The resource dependence position is closer to the concept of interlocking as prestige because the influential organization is that which has the ability to coopt other organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1 978). Thus, the more influential corporation receives more interlocks than it sends. However, what the receiving corporation has, first and foremost, is control overcrucial resources. Prestige, if it in factaccompanies centrality in this case, is a secondary concern.
Furthermore, this position is not contradictory to a resource dependence perspective, since control overspecific resources, such as loan capital, is frequently what allows a firm a seat on another firm's board. As Aldrich (1979:296) has pointed out, "the term cooptation may involve too much 'voluntarism' in some cases, such as when taking on a director from a bank is the price a firm pays for having its corporate bonds underwritten." Historically, there is far more evidence to support the "sending as influence" perspective advanced here. The evidence for recent years is not conclusive either way. However, one of the major advantages of this measure is that it allows for flexibility in response to changing theoretical requirements. The weights for sending and receiving can be altered in any way, or even reversed, to suit alternative theoretical criteria. on the full network of all interlocks; (3) a centrality index based on strong ties only; and (4) a centrality index based on strong ties weig hted for di rectiona lity. Table 1 lists the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the four measures for all 1 66 firms in the sample. Although the relation between the numberof interlocks and full network centrality was quite strong (.89), the results of the more complex measures were increasingly different from those based on the number of interlocks.
RESULTS
Four measures of relative influence in corporate networks
Given the substantial differences in results, the historical record must be examined to determine the efficacy of each of the four measures. Table 2 Because of the high correlation between the number of interlocks and the full network centrality score, it appeared that the number of sending interlocks might be used interchangeably with directional centrality scores. The correlation between directional interlocking and directional centrality in these data was .87, and the correlation between all interlocks and directional interlocks was .62. Thus, while it is true that most of the variation in directional centrality was accounted for by directional interlocking, there are two reasons why the centrality score is preferable. First, the interlock measure does not control for number of directors, weights all interlocks evenly, and treats the individual firm as the unit of analysis. Second, there were a number of cases in which the superiority of the centrality measure was clearly evident. For example, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. had only 9.0 directional interlocks but was twelfth in centrality. Equitable Life had 14.5 directional interlocks but was ranked only thirty-first in centrality. There are occasions in which unusually high centrality was derived from one particular interlock with another highly central firm. Mintz and Schwartz (1978) devised a technique for "denormalizing" the network by removing from a firm's centrality score any link with firms whose centrality is more than a certain proportion (80 percent in their 484/ASQ, Septem ber 1 981 study) of its centrality. This technique did not produce an appreciable change in the rankings of the most central firms in the present study.
Centrality by Sector
To determine the relative influence of different sectors of the economy, an analysis of variance in centrality by sector was conducted (see Table 3 ). In the full network, railroads as a group were highlycentral and industrials had lowcentrality. Insurance companies, investment banks, and commercial banks, which were treated together as financials, accounted for only 6.2 percent of the variation, and .9 percent came from a negative direction because of the low centrality of investment banks. In all, 28.1 percent of the variation in centrality was accounted for by type of firm. Results were different for the strong tie and directional strong tie networks. Although industrial centrality remained low, railroad centrality dropped sharply from 14.6 percent of the total variation to 2.7 percent in the strong tie network and .1 percent in the directional network. interlocks by sector in the present data produced an explained variation of 27.5 percent. Industrials accounted for 7 percent of total variation, railroads for 9.8 percent, insurances .9 percent, investment banks 1.9 percent, and banks 7.7 percent.
This pattern suggests that the high full network centrality of railroads was a result of the frequent placement of financial representatives on railroads' boards, as well as the latter's high proportion of neutral interlocks. This is consistent with historical evidence of the importance of railroads at the turn of the century and their heavy dependence on financials. It is also consistent with evidence of the pivotal role played by financial institutions in the economy. Thus, from analysis of both the most central corporations and the network as a whole, the measure that considers network centrality, eliminates weak ties, and weights interlocks according to direction provides the most accurate measure of influence among corporations.
CONCLUSION
The above results strongly suggest that studies of network centrality and influence will be strengthened by accounting for the direction of network ties. In studies employing multiple regression and other multivariate techniques, the use of centrality scores rather than interlocks as variables might improve the predictability of models of corporate growth, profitability, debt-equity ratios, and other characteristics of corporations. Mizruchi, 1981) , but systematic, independent evidence for their influence has been difficult to assemble. This study suggests that a centrality measure based on a network of strong ties weighted for directionality would prove useful in assembling this evidence.
